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DECONSTRUCTING WYETH v. LEVINE:
THE NEW LIMITS ON IMPLIED
CONFLICT PREEMPTION
David C Vladeck'
This Symposium was convened to explore the state of the civil
justice system in the United States. At the time, Wyeth v. Levine' was
pending before the United States Supreme Court, and a decision was
not anticipated until the end of the Term. My project was to comment
on the state of the Court's jurisprudence in regulatory implied conflict
preemption cases. These are cases in which federal regulatory action
is said to pre-empt state tort or products liability law because the
application of state law is alleged to obstruct the fulfillment of federal
regulatory objectives. The issue is important, not just because the
disposition of Wyeth would decide whether failure-to-warn cases
against drug companies are preempted, but also because Wyeth was
seen as a test case for President George W. Bush's campaign to
use regulatory implied conflict preemption to provide businesses
insulation from state tort and products liability cases. From 2002
through 2008, each of the nation's key federal health and safety
regulatory agencies-including the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)-took the position that
virtually any regulatory action taken by the agency, including
statements in regulatory preambles and obscure references on agency
fDirector, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection; Professor of Law
and Director, Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law Center. Prior to
joining Georgetown's faculty, Professor Vladeck was an attorney with Public Citizen Litigation
Group, where, among other things, he handled cases for public health organizations against
federal agencies, including those agencies discussed in this Essay, as well as cases involving
preemption questions, arguing in favor of preserving state law. The author is grateful for the
comments of Catherine M. Sharkey, Roderick M. Hills, Linda S. Mullenix, other symposium
participants, members of the Case Western Reserve Law School Law Review, and my
Georgetown colleague Kathryn A. Sabbeth.
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web-sites, had the effect of wiping away state law. If that position
were upheld by the courts, Americans injured through no fault of their
own by everyday consumer products might find themselves without
any remedy at all.
As discussed below, the Court's recent ruling in Wyeth
emphatically rejects the FDs argument that its approval of a
drug's label preempts state failure-to-warn claims. The decision also
clarifies and, in my view, narrows considerably the doctrine of
regulatory implied conflict preemption, and does so in a way that
likely consigns the Bush Administration's pro-preemption efforts to
repudiation by the courts.
Before turning to Wyeth, it is useful to explore the critique of the
Court's regulatory implied preemption jurisprudence before Wyeth,
which helps explain why the Bush Administration thought it could
reshape tort law through implied regulatory preemption and why
many commentators predicted a big win for Wyeth. The Essay then
turns to discuss the background for the Wyeth litigation and the
possibly far-reaching implications of the Court's decision.
1. THE PRE- WIETH CRITIQUE
The analysis courts apply in preemption cases is. at least as a
matter of structure, well settled. Courts are instructed first to examine
whether Congress has included in the relevant statute an express
preemption provision that specifically forecloses the state law,
regulation, requirement, or other state-mandate under attack.2
Difficult interpretative questions often arise about the reach of
express preemption provisions.3 But in express preemption cases, the
Court's first focus is on the meaning of the preemption provision
Congress drafted, an inquiry guided by well-settled tools of statutory
construction.4
2 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128
S. Ct. 999 (2008); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
3Compare, e.g., Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (interpreting the preemption provision in the
Medical Device Act to preempt state product liability cases regarding medical devices
specifically approved by the FDA), with Medtronic, Inc. v, Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)
(interpreting the preemption provision in the Medical Device Act not to preempt cases regarding
medical devices permitted on the market because they are substantially equivalent to devices on
the market at the time the Act was passed or substantially equivalent to devices specifically
approved by the FDA).
4In these cases, the statutory canon the Court employs most frequently is the federalism
canon that presumes "that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Napier v. Atlantic Coast line R.R. Co., 272
U.S. 605, 611 (1926)). This presumption "applies with particular force when Congress has
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More complicated analytical questions arise if there is no express
preemption provision that forecloses the state action. Courts then
must undertake field, conflict, and implied conflict preemption
analysis.5 The inquiry is to determine whether, although Congress did
not say so explicitly, circumstances compel the conclusion that
Congress intended to displace state law, because Congress wanted a
federal regulatory regime to occupy the field or because state law
either actually conflicts with federal dictates or would frustrate the
attainment of federal objectives.6 As the Court has repeatedly driven
home, '"[tlhe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in
every pre-emption case. " 7
As I have written elsewhere, this analytical structure has led courts
to hold far more state law-especially state tort and damages law-
preempted than Congress intended or is necessary to the achievement
of federal goals. 8 Adding to the confusion is that the justifications
legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States." Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543 (citing
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
The Court most recently emphasized the vitality of this canon in Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543,
although the Court left the canon unmentioned in Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999. There is, of course, a
long-simmering debate over the utility of substantive canons, but this Essay leaves that debate to
others. Compare, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COuRTS
AND THE LAw 28-29 (1997) (denigrating substantive canons generally), with William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989)
(defending substantive canons).
5See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (describing field
preemption); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(describing conflict preemption); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (describing field preemption); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (describing obstacle preemption). It bears noting that, even
where Congress has included an express preemption provision, questions of field, conflict, and
implied preemption questions may arise. Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. 538, is an example of such a
case. Having rejected the tobacco company's claim that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act expressly preempted state fraud cases against the company, the Court then
turned to the company's fall back argument that such claims were impliedly preempted because
they conflicted with the Federal Trade Commission's policies on tobacco regulation. Id. at 546,
549. Although the Court rejected both arguments, it nonetheless recognized the possibility that
implied preemption principles could apply even where there was an express preemption case. Id.
at 549; see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (stating that the
"inclusion of an express pre-emption clause 'does not bar the ordinary working of conflict [or
implied] pre-emption principles"'. (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869
(2000))); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (applying implied preemption principles to find product
liability claim preempted even though the claim was not covered by the statute's express
preemption provision).
6 See generally Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543; Bates, 544 U.S. at 449; Sprietsnia, 537
U.S. at 65; United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74;
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995).
7 Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhom. 375 U.S. 96. 103 (1963))).
8 See David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-Inflicted Wound or the
Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O'Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 981
(2008) [hereinafter Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost]; David A. Kessler & David C.
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courts invoke for non-express preemption-field, conflict, and
implied conflict preemption-are imprecise, overlapping, and
inconsistently applied, which leads to uncertainty about when state
law will be set aside?9 This lack of analytic clarity is a problem
not simply for regulated entities, those injured by products
made by regulated entities, and the courts, but it is also a serious
problem for Congress and state legislatures trying to reach sensible
accommodations about the allocation of regulatory power.'0
But the point of this brief Essay is not to launch a broad-sided
attack on conventional preemption analysis. There has already been a
tank car's worth of ink spilled doing just that." Rather, this Essay
focuses solely on the Court's regulatory implied conflict preemption
analysis-that is, the analytical path the Court follows where a party
(generally backed by a federal regulatory agency) claims that
application of state law will frustrate the attainment of federal goals,
even where it is possible to comply simultaneously with both federal
and state dictates. The Court has ruled that state law may be ousted in
such circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that there is (a) no
express preemption provision, (b) no direct conflict between federal
and state law, and (c) no indication that Congress wanted to foreclose
all state regulation in a given field.'12 Some Justices have expressed
discomfit with the very idea that courts can displace state law in these
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96
GEO. L.J. 461 (2008) [hereinafter Kessler & Viadeck, A Critical Examination]; David C.
Viadeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (2005).
9See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION
119 (Willim W. Buzbee ed., 2009); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 262
(2000).
10 Consider the uncertainty engendered by the Court's ruling in Geier, 529 U.S. 861,
where the Court found the plaintiffs product liability action preempted, even though the
relevant statute, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, has a savings provision directly addressed to
common law actions that states "[c]omplianice with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed
under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law." 49 U.S.C. §
30103(e) (2000). See generally Sandi Zelliner, When Congress Goes Unheard: Savings
Clauses' Rocky Judicial Reception, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 9, at 144, 164-65
(arguing that "giving savings clauses appropriate weight would honor congressional choices,
avoid regulatory gaps, and enhance institutional competency by empowering governments at all
levels to protect the public").
1E.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX.
L. REv. 1321 (2001); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of
State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 561 (1997); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 (2007); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004);
Nelson, supra note 9; Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. 861.
886 Vol. 59:4
2009] DECONSTRUCTING WYETH V. LEWINE88
circumstances.'13 But because the implied preemption doctrine is by
now embedded deeply in the Court's preemption jurisprudence, this
Essay does not call for its reevaluation.
Prior to the Court's ruling in Wyeth v. Levine, my claim
would have been that the Court's approach in implied preemption
cases-exemplified in the Court's 5-4 ruling in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co. 1 4-pushed courts to find preemption in cases in
which the displacement of state law actually subverts the attainment
of goals articulated in the federal statutes. 15 The theory of preemption,
of course, is that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires
state law to yield when it interferes with the attainment of goals
Congress set in the legitimate exercise of its powers, generally under
the Commerce Clause. 16
Before Wyeth, the failure of courts to consider whether federal
regulatory efforts, on their own, are adequate to fulfill Congress's
objectives threatened to stand the purpose of implied preemption
analysis on its head. Where a finding of preemption removes a market
discipline imposed by state law, and that market discipline in fact
serves to advance Congress' goals (even indirectly), then a finding
of implied preemption may undermine rather than advance federal
objectives. There are two reasons often related for why federal
regulatory efforts may not satisfactorily advance federal goals; first,
the agency may lack the competence to do its job effectively,
generally because it lacks needed resources or statutory authority; or,
second, the agency may be "captured" or unduly influenced by the
industry it is charged with regulating. In either case, a ruling that
federal action-no matter how ineffectual-preempts state law may
result in thwarting federal objectives.
As noted, Geier was, prior to Wyeth, the Court's main
pronouncement on regulatory implied preemption. Geier involved a
claim by Alexis Geier, a young woman who was seriously injured
13 For instance, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, wrote approvingly of the "Court's increasing reluctance to expand federal statutes
beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption." 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In Geier, Justice
Stevens' dissent, in which Justice Thomas joined, emphasized the importance of "prevent[ing]
federal judges from running amok with [the] potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately
considered) doctrine of implied conflict pre-emption based on frustration of purposes." 529 U.S.
at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And in Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n,
Justice Kennedy voiced concern that "[a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state
statute is in tension with federal objectives would undercut the principle that it is Congress
rather than the courts that pre-empts state law." 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
14 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
15 It goes without saying that displacement of state law subverts the state's goals.
16 See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 9.
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when her 1987 Honda, equipped with just a shoulder harness and a
lap belt, crashed into a tree. She sued, claiming that cars lacking air
bags were defectively designed. But the Court held, 5-4, that her
claim was preempted because a standard promulgated by NHTSA
gave manufacturers a choice of installing air bags or non-detachable
belts.
Congress established NHTSA in 1966 to set safety standards that
are "practicable" and that "meet the need for motor vehicle safety." 17
When Congress wrote the Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act")-
the legislation creating NHTSA-it included an express preemption
provision that said no state may "prescribe or continue in effect a
standard applicable to the same aspect of performance" that is not
"identical" to the federal standard. 18 But Congress went on to add a
"6savings clause" that provides that "[~c]ompliance with" a NHTSA
standard "does not exempt a person from liability at common law." 19
Geier called on the Court to decide whether NHTSA's
"1occupant protection" (passive restraint) standard preempted state tort
law .20 The standard, first adopted in 1967, initially required
manufacturers to install lap and shoulder belts, but NHTSA soon
found that many occupants did not bother fastening their belts.2
Consumer groups urged NHTSA to require a new technology-air
bags-that operated automaticall y.2 2 NHTSA revised the standard in
1971 to require either air bags or automatic seatbelts for front seat
occupants by 1975.2
But the auto industry objected. Henry Ford and Ford President Lee
Iacocca met secretly with President Nixon to urge that the standard
be scrapped.2 After the meeting, Nixon called Secretary of
Transportation John Volpe and told him to rescind the rule, which he
did.2 NHTSA then adopted the industry's proposal to mandate the
use of "ignition interlock" devices that prevented the car from starting
until front-seat occupants had buckled up.26 The public hated the
17 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (a) (2000).
18 Id. § 30103(b)(1).
19 Id. § 30103(e).
20 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864-65 (2000). For a riveting, detailed
account of the history of the air bag standard-setting and litigation, see THOMAS 0. MCGARrry,
THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 62-64 (2008).
21 Geier, 529 U.S. at 875.
22 Id. at 875-76.
23 Id.
24 See New Tape: Ford Co. Officials Pressed Nixon on Air-Bag Rules, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, Nov. 28, 1982.
25 Id.
26 Geier, 529 U.S. at 876.
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hard-to-use interlock devices, and Congress soon amended the Safety
Act to forbid their use.2
It was not until the Carter Administration that NHTSA revived the
passive-restraint standard. In 1977 the agency gave the industry until
model year 1982 to install air bags or automatic belts, but the Reagan
Administration rescinded the standard in 1981 .2 Insurance companies
and consumer groups sued NHTSA, challenging the validity of the
rescission. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,29 the Supreme Court agreed,
finding that NHTSA had arbitrarily bowed to industry pressure
in withdrawing the standard. Responding to this defeat, and having
no choice, NHTSA finally issued a new standard that required
manufacturers, over a lengthy phase-in period, to install either air
bags or non-detachable belts with shoulder harnesses, although the
standard reflected a slight preference for air bags .3
NHTSA's new standard was criticized for further delaying the
widespread introduction of air bags .3 1 By' this point, the evidence
demonstrated that air bags were easy to install, affordable, and far
more protective than automatic belts.3 As a result of NHTSA' s
gradual phase-in, however, many new cars were not equipped with air
bags, leading to needless injuries and deaths .3  One such case
involved Alexis Geier, who sued Honda, claiming that cars lacking
air bags were defectively designed.
Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Geier first rejected Honda's
argument that the Safety Act expressly preempted Geier's claim
because the Act's savings clause explicitly preserved it. 34
Nonetheless, the Court turned to Honda's implied preemption
arguments under "the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles."3 The Court recognized that Congress intended the
savings clause to "preserve[] those actions that seek to establish
greater safety protection than the minimum safety achieved by
a federal regulation intended to provide a floor," but concluded that
21 Id.
28 Id. at 876-77; see also MCGARITY, supra note 20, at 63.
29 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
30 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 49 Fed. Reg.
28,962 (July 17, 1984).
31 See, e.g., Jack Keebler & Liz Pinto, 'Passive' Restraints Criticized: Traffic Safety
Agency Moving to Report Failure ofAutomatic Seat Belts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 16, 199 1,
at S I; see also McGA~rry, supra note 20, at 62-64 (detailing the development of the passive
restraint rule by the NHTSA).
32 Keebler & Pinto, supra note 3 1.
33 MCGARITY, supra note 20, at 65.
34 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).
35 Id. at 869.
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the savings provision did not necessarily "'save' all state-law
tort actions, regardless of their potential threat to the objectives
of federal safety standards."3 The express preemption provision did
suggest a congressional interest in avoiding "conflict, uncertainty,
cost, and occasional risk to safety itself that too many
different Safety[] standard[s] .. . might otherwise create"-policy
considerations the Court saw as favoring implied preemption of state
conmmon law .3 ' Relying heavily on NHTSA's preamble to the final
standard, the Court concluded that permitting Geier' s tort claim to go
forward would conflict with NHTSA' s decision to provide for a
"gradual phase-in" of air-bags to "lower costs, overcome technical
safety problems, encourage technological development, and win
widespread consumer acceptance." 38
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Stevens argued that federal
regulatory objectives "would not be frustrated one whit by allowing
state courts to determine whether in 1987 the lifesaving advantages of
air bags had become sufficiently obvious that their omnission might
constitute a design defect in some new cars."3 Indeed, as the dissent
explained,
The phase-in program . . . thus set minimum percentage
requirements for the installation of passive restraints ....
Those requirements were not ceilings, and it is obvious that
the Secretary favored a more rapid increase. The possibility
that exposure to potential tort liability might accelerate the
rate of increase would actually further the only goal explicitly
mentioned in the standard itself: reducing the number of
deaths and severity of injuries of vehicle occupants.4
The dissenters' point was borne out by NHTSA' s later estimation that
as many as sixty-three thousand more lives could have been saved
41
had all manufacturers installed air bags at the outset.
Geier has been subject to three lines of criticism. The first is that
the Court approached NHTSA' s effort with an unrealistic view of the
ability of federal agencies to achieve regulatory goals on their own,
without the backstop of state tort and products liability law. In some
cases, including Geier, that assumption might have been unwarranted.
36 Id. at 870.
37 Id. at 871.
38 Id. at 875, 879.
39 Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 903-04.
41 See Keebler & Pinto, supra note 3 1. See generally McGARrry, supra note 20, at 61-64
(discussing preemption in the context of transportation regulation of automobiles).
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That assumption is based on an idealized view of the state of our
federal regulatory agencies that may have little grounding in reality. It
assumes that agencies have the resources they need to do their jobs;
that agencies have the budget, equipment and personnel to
accomplish their mission; that agencies have the ability to obtain all
of the information they need swiftly and with no questions about the
information's accuracy or completeness; that agencies are able to
quickly and decisively respond to emerging hazards; and that
agencies can operate free of untoward political influence and can take
action based on the merits and only on the merits. Each of these
assumptions may be unjustified. And each is a potential danger signal
that the agency lacks the resources to do its job effectively. In those
instances, a pro-preemption determination rests on nothing more than
the fiction that an under-funded, under-staffed, information-deprived,
politically-constrained agency can, on its own, fulfill the function that
Congress assigned to it.4 2
The second critique of Geier is that it failed to address the
possibility that state law, including state liability law, helps further
federal health and safety objectives by deterring excessive risk-taking,
providing information that might otherwise not come to light, and
serving a compensatory function generally unaddressed but
complementary to federal goals.4 As the dissenters pointed out,
accelerating the introduction of airbags would have furthered, not
frustrated, the Safety Act's goals, which are fundamentally to protect
motor vehicle occupants from injury.
Third is the agency-capture critique, which the Court also
side-stepped in Geier. Courts must be alert for danger signals of
agency capture that suggest an agency's plea for preemption may not
be consistent with Congress' goal or otherwise serve the public
42 There certainly were danger signals that NHTSA fit that description. NHTSA faces a
formidable challenge in trying to regulate the automobile industry, which includes not only all
of the car makers (domestic and foreign), but also the manufacturers of trucks, school buses, and
the component parts used in motor vehicles. NHTSA has a skeletal staff, numbering well below
1,000 employees. It has a tiny research budget. It is one "David" facing many Goliaths. See
McGARrY, supra note 20, at 60-111 (discussing the preemption war in the courts); David C.
Vladeck, Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors Fried and Rosenberg, 31 SETaN
HALL L. REV. 631, 639-41 (200 1) (discussing the shortcomings of the NHTSA and the effect on
its regulatory abilities); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET IN BRIEF 70,
http://www.dot.gov/bib2008/pdf/bib2008.pdf (identifying NHTSA staffing authorization at 635
full time employees).
43 See, e.g., Kessler & Vladeck, A Critical Examination, supra note 8, at 491-95 (citing
numerous authorities and arguing that failure-to-warn litigation helps further the FDA's efforts
tu ensurc thc safcty of drugs); see also McGARITY, supra note 20, at 60-111 (discussing the
preemption war in the courts); Aaron S. Kcsselheim & Jenry Avomn, The Role of Litigation in
Defining Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308, 310 (2007) (citing examples of the impact that litigation
has on regulatory behavior).
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interest. What is surprising about the Geier majority opinion is that it
accepted uncritically the Department's assertion that it made a
considered judgment that a gradual phase-in of air bags was important
to develop public acceptance of air bags and a better understanding of
how to make better and safer air bags, and that its phase-in plan best
served the Safety Act's purpose. Although the Court cited State Farm
as part of its discussion of the history of the regulation of air bags, it
said nothing about the ruling in State Farm-namely, that the
Department of Transportation (DOT), succumbing to intense pressure
from the automobile industry, had arbitrarily and capriciously
determined to delay the phase-in of air bags. Indeed, the State Farm
Court famously observed that "[flor nearly a decade, the automobile
industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war against the airbag,"
and the Court faulted DOT for capitulating to the industry rather than
serving the public interest."4 State Farm is the paradigmatic agency
capture case.
In my view, the signal defect of Geier is that it is completely
ahistoric. The Court's opinion in State Farm shows that it had every
reason to be skeptical that the phase-in of air-bags was designed to
fulfill the Safety Act and to question whether the phase-in was
implemented in part to appease a disgruntled and powerful industry
still waging the regulatory equivalent of war against the mandatory
introduction of airbags. The lesson of Geier is that where there is
evidence of an agency giving ground to placate a powerful industry,
courts should independently examine whether the agency's assertion
of fidelity to statutory goals is sound, rather than simply accepting the
agency's assertion at face value.
44 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983).
The relevant passage of the Court's opinion in State Farmn is worth quoting in its entirety:
The automobile industry has opted for the passive belt over the airbag, but surely
it is not enough that the regulated industry has eschewed a given safety device. For
nearly a decade, the automobile industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war
against the airbag and lost-the inflatable restraint was proved sufficiently effective.
Now the automobile industry has decided to employ a seatbelt system which will not
meet the safety objectives of Standard 208. This hardly constitutes cause to revoke
the Standard itself. Indeed, the Act was necessary because the industry was not
sufficiently responsive to safety concerns. The Act intended that safety standards not
depend on current technology and could be 'technology-forcing' in the sense of
inducing the development of superior safety design. If, under the statute, the agency
should not defer to the industry's failure to develop safer cars, which it surely should
not do. a fortiori it may not revoke a safety standard which can be satisfied by
current technology simply because the industry has opted for an ineffective seatbelt
design.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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HI. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PRO-PREEMPTION PUSH
In the wake of Geier, the Bush Administration decided to try to
accomplish "tort reform"' by directing health and safety agencies to
seek to preempt state tort and products liability law by declaring that
agency regulatory action had the effect of wiping away state law .4
After all, the Court in Geier signaled that, in assessing implied
regulatory preemption claims, the courts should take their cues from
the federal agency's assertion that state law was an obstacle to the
fulfillment of federal goals.
The FDA started and perhaps was the incubator of this campaign.
For most of its long history, the FDA had consistently taken the
position that its regulatory efforts could comfortably coexist with
state failure-to-warn litigation brought by consumers injured by FDA-
regulated drugs.46 But the agency did an about-face in 2002, claiming,
first in amicus briefs and then in a 2006 Federal Register notice
accompanying a new rule on labeling, that failure-to-warn litigation
threatens the agency's ability to protect the public health .4  According
to the agency, warnings that overstate or exaggerate risks are no more
helpful to physicians and patients than warnings that inappropriately
downplay those risks. Striking the right balance is uniquely the
FDA's province. A judicial determination that an FDA-approved
warning label fails adequately to Warn may force manufacturers to
add warnings the FDA did not approve, or even warnings that the
FDA considered and rejected . 8 To prevent this conflict between
FDA-mandated warnings and state court judgments, the FDA asserted
45 See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State
Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I110th Cong. 172-97 (2007)
(statement of David C. Viadeck, Georgetown Univ. Prof. of Law and Member Scholar, Ctr. for
Progressive Reform) [hereinafter Statement of David C. Viadeck]; VWi~iam Funk et al., The
Truth about Torts: Using Agency Preemption to Undercut Consumer Health and Safety, CPR
WHITE PAP'ER # 704 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 2007, at 1.
46 See Kessler & Viadeck, A Critical Examination, supra note 8, at 463; Margaret Jane
Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 9 (1997).
47 See Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost, supra note 8, at 985; see also Requirements
on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biological Products, 71
Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (amending
FDA regulations regarding content and format of labeling for human prescription drug
products); Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court's Order Denying Partial Summary
Judgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 23-24, Motms v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d
659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WLt 32303084 (arguing that failure-to-
warn litigation would obstruct the FDCA's purposes and objectives).
48 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935.
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that its approval of labeling preempts most failure-to-warn
litigation.4
Other agencies soon joined in, with the CPSC and NHTSA
asserting that their standards preempt state law .50  And similar
pronouncements from other agencies, including the Federal Railroad
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security, followed.
In just a few years, literally dozens of agency Federal Notices took
the position that some agency action short of a regulation preempted
state tort law. 51 And some agencies, like the FDA, claim that even
notices on agency web-sites preempt state tort law.5
49 See id. ("[Additional requirements for the disclosure of risk information .. can erode
and disrupt the careful and truthful representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to
make appropriate judgments about drug use. Exaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate
use of a beneficial drug.").
50 The preamble to the CPSC's final rule on mattress flammability standards takes the
position that the rule preempts state tort law. Commissioner Thomas Moore files a strong
dissent. See Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattresses and Mattress/Foundation
Sets; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 70 Fed. Reg. 2470, 2493 (proposed Jan. 13, 2005) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633); Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of
Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633). In a
similar vein, NHSTA issued a series of proposed standards in 2005 and 2006 taking the position
that the standards would preempt state law. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof
Crush Resistance, 73 Fed. Reg. 5484 (proposed Jan. 30, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R pt.
57 1) (final roof crush resistance proposal); 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (initial roof crush resistance proposal); Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards; Rearview Mirrors, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,753 (proposed Sept. 12, 2005) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 57t) (proposal for rearview mirrors); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Designated Seating Positions and Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, 73 Fed. Reg.
58,887 (Oct. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (final proposal for seating position
standards); 70 Fed. Reg. 36,094 (proposed June 22, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571)
(initial proposal for seating position standards).
51 Final agency rules which assert in the preamble to the final rule that the rule will
preempt tort law include:
Food and Drug Administration _________________
Subiect Matter Citation
Physician labeling rule Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
__________________________ 3922, 3933-36 (Jan. 24, 2006).
Noncariogenic sweeteners Food Labeling: Health Claims; Dietary
Noncariogenic Carbohydrate Sweeteners
and Dental Caries, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,559,
15,563 (Mar. 29, 2006); Food Labeling:
Health Claims; Noncariogenic
Carbohydrate Sweeteners and Dental
Caries, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,783, 52,788
___________________________ (Sept. 17, 2007).
Raw fruits, vegetables, fish Food Labeling: Guidelines for Voluntary
Nutrition Labeling of Raw Fruits,
Vegetables, and Fish, 71 Fed. Reg.
__________________________ 
42,031, 42,042-43 (July 25, 2006).
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OTC nasal medication Cold, Cough, Allergy, Bronchodilator,
and Antiasthmatic Drug Products for
Over-the-Counter Human Use;
Amendment of Monograph for OTC
Nasal Decongestant Drug Products, 71
Fed. Reg. 43,358, 43,361-62 (Aug. 1,
2006).
Calcium Food Labeling: Health Claims; Calcium
and Osteoporosis, and Calcium, Vitamin
D, and Osteoporosis, 73 Fed. Reg.
_________________________ 56,477, 56,4815-86 (Sept. 29, 2008).
Nutrient content claims Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims,
Expansion of the Nutrient Content Claim
"Lean," 72 Fed. Reg. 1455, 1458-59
(Jan. 12, 2007).
OTC dandruff products Dandruff, Seborrheic Dermatitis, and
Psoriasis Drug Products Containing Coal
Tar and Menthol for Over-the-Counter
Human Use, 72 Fed. Reg. 9849, 9851
(Mar. 6, 2007).
OTC laxatives Laxative Drug Products for Over-the-
Counter Human Use; Psyllium
Ingredients in Granular Dosage Forms,
72 Fed. Reg. 14,669, 14,673-74 (Mar.
29, 2007).
OTC contraceptives Over-the-Counter Vaginal Contraceptive
and Spermicide Drug Products
Containing Nonoxynol 9; Required
Labeling, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,769, 71,783-
84 (Dec. 19, 2007).
Skin protectant drug products Skin Protectant Drug Products for Over-
the-Counter Human Use; Reduced
Labeling, 73 Fed. Reg. 6014, 6016-17
________________________(Feb. 1, 2008).
Soluble fiber and risk of coronary Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble
heart disease Fiber from Certain Foods and Risk of
Coronary Heart Disease, 73 Fed. Reg.
9938, 9945-46 (Feb. 25, 2008); Food
Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Fiber
from Certain Foods and Risk of
Coronary Heart Disease, 73 Fed. Reg.
__________________________23,947, 23,952-53 (May 1, 2008).
Adverse event reporting Toll-Free Number for Reporting Adverse
Events on Labeling for Human Drug
Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 63,886, 63,896-
___________________________97 (Oct. 28, 2008).
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Subect Matter ICitation
Door locks and door rctcntio Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stanidards;
components Door Locks and Door Retentioni
IComponents, 72 Fed. Reg. 5385, 5397-981
I(Feb. 6, 2007).
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Electronic stability control Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Electronic Stability Control Systems;
Controls and Displays, 72 Fed. Reg.
17,236, 17,300-01 (Apr. 6, 2007); Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Electronic Stability Control Systems;
Controls and Displays, 73 Fed. Reg.
__________________________ 54,526, 54,536 (Sept. 22, 2008).
Head restraints Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Head Restraints, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,484, 25,
__________________________ 512 (May 4, 2007).
Tire pressurc monuiitorinig Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 72 Fed.
___________________________ Reg. 38,017, 38,023-24 (July 12, 2007).
Occupant crash protection Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Occupant Crash Protection, 72 Fed. Reg.
__________________________ 40,252, 40,257 (July 24, 2007).
Interior impact protection Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Occupant Protection in interior Impact, 72
__________________________ Fed. Reg. 50,900, 50, 905 (Sept. 5, 2007).
Side impact (electric cars) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Occupant Protection in Interior Impact;
Side Impact Protection; Fuel System
Integrity; Electric-Powered Vehicles:
Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical Shock
Protection; Side Impact Phase-I
Reporting Requirements, 72 Fed. Reg.
51,908, 51,953 (Sept. 11, 2007).
Power-operated windows Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Power-Operated Window, Partition, and
Roof-Panel Systems, 73 Fed. Reg. 38, 331,
38,338-39 (July 7, 2008).
Lamps and reflective devices Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Lamps, Reflective Devices, and
Associated Equipment, 72 Fed. Reg.
_________________________ 68,234, 68,265 (Dec. 4, 2007).
Occupant crash protection (update to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Appendix A) Occupant Crash Protection, 73 Fed. Reg.
66,786, 66,796 (Nov. 12, 2008).
School bus passenger seating Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Seating Systems, Occupant Crash
Protection, Seat Belt Assembly
Anchorages, School Bus Passenger
Seating and Crash Protection, 73 Fed.
_______________________ I Reg. 62,744, 62,777-78 (Oct. 21,2008).
Federal Railroad Administration __________________
Subiect Matter Citation
Railroad operating standards Railroad Operating Rules: Program of
Operational Tests and Inspections;
Railroad Operating Practices: HandlinI
Equipment, Switches and Fixed Derails,
73 Fed. Reg. 8442, 8494-95, 8498 (Feb.13,2008).
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Continuous welded rail Track Safety Standards; Inspections of
Joints in Continuous Welded Rail, 71 Fed.
Reg .59,677, 59,690 (Oct. 11, 2006).
Electronically controlled pneumatic Electronically Controlled Pneumatic
brakes Brake Systems, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,512,
61,550-51 (Oct. 16, 2008).
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Subject Matter Citation
Mattress flammahility Standard for the Flammability (Open
Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg.
13,472, 13,496-97 (Mar. 15, 2006).
Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Subiect Matter Citation
Transportation of Hazardous Materials Hazardous Materials: Improving the
by Rail (joint nule with FRA) Safety of Railroad Tank Car
Transportation of Hazardous Materials,
_________________________ 74 Fed. Reg. 1770, 1790 (Jan. 13, 2009).
Enhancing rail transportation security Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Rail
(joint rule with FRA) Transportation Safety and Security for
Hazardous Materials Shipments, 73 Fed.
______________________ I Reg. 20,752, 20,768-70 (Apr. 16, 2008).
Department of Homeland Security
Subegct Matter Citation
Chemical facility anti-terrorism Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688, 17,726-
27 (Apr. 9, 2007).
Proposed rules containing preamble language claiming preemption:
Food and Drug Administration
Subiect Matter Citation
Skin bleaching products Skin Bleaching Drug Products for Over-
the-Counter Human Use, 71 Fed. Reg.
51,146, 51,153 (proposed Aug. 29,
2006).
OTC drugs in trial size packages Over-the-Counter Human Drugs;
Labeling Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg.
74,474, 74,480-81 (proposed Dec. 12,
2006).
OTC analgesics Internal Analgesic, Antipyretic, and
Antirheumatic Drug Products for Over-
the-Counter Human Use; Proposed
Amendment of the Tentative Final
Monograph; Required Warnings and
Other Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,314,
__________________________77,345 (proposed Dec. 26, 2006).
Calcium Food Labeling: Health Claims; Calcium
and Osteoporosis, and Calcium, Vitamin
D, and Osteoporosis, 72 Fed. Reg. 497,
________________________516 (proposed Jan. 5, 2007).
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Sunscreen products Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-
Counter Human Use; Proposed
Amendment of Final Monograph, 72
Fed. Reg. 49,070, 49,109 (proposed Aug.
27, 2007).
Fatty acids Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims;
Aipha-Linolenic Acid, Eicosapentaenoic
Acid, and Docosahexaenoic Acid
Omega-3 Fatty Acids, 72 Fed. Reg.
66,103, 66,116-17 (proposed Nov. 27,
2007).
Pregnancy and lactation labeling Content and Formnat of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products; Requirements for Pregnancy
and Lactation Labeling, 73 Fed. Reg.
30,831, 30,861-62 (proposed May 29,
1 1_________________ 2008).1
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Subiect Matter Citation
Roof crush resistance Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg.
49,223, 49,245-46 (proposed Aug. 23,
_____________________________2005).
Rearview mirrors Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Rearview Mirrors, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,753
__________________________53,768 (proposed Sept. 12, 2005).
Occupant protection Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Occupant Crash Protection, 72 Fed. Reg.
54,402, 54,409-10 (proposed Sept. 25,
___________________________2007).
Electric-powered vehicles Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Electric-Powered Vehicles: Electrolyte
Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection,
72 Fed. Reg. 57,260, 57,265-66 (proposed
__________________________Oct. 9, 2007).
Brake hoses Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Brake Hoses, 72 Fed. Reg. 57,459, 57,468
__________________________(proposed Oct. 9, 2007).
School bus passenger seating Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Seating Systems, Occupant Crash
Protection, Seat Belt Assembly
Anchorages, School Bus Passenger Seating
and Crash Protection, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,509,
__________________________65,525 (proposed Nov. 21, 2007).
Platform lifts Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Platform Lifts for Motor Vehicles;
Platform Lift Installations in Motor
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,326, 72,335-36
________________________(proposed Dec. 20, 2007).
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Child restraint systems Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards,
Child Restraint Systems; Anthropomorphic
Test Devices (Hybrid III 10-Year-Old and
Hybrid Ill 6-Year-Old Child Dummies),
73 Fed. Reg. 3901, 3911 (proposed Jan.
23, 2008).
Windshield zone intrusion Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Windshield Zone Intrusion, 73 Fed. Reg.
38,372, 38,373 (proposed July 7, 2008).
Occupant crash (remove sunset Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
provision) Occupant Crash Protection, 73 Fed. Reg.
52,939, 52,941-42 (proposed Sept. 12,
2008).
Motorcycle brake systems Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Motorcycle Brake Systems, 73 Fed. Reg.
54,020, 54,034-35 (proposed Sept. 17,
__________________________ 2008).
Motorcycle helmets Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Motorcycle Helmets, 73 Fed. Reg.
_______________________ 5 7,297, 57,3 10 (proposed Oct. 2, 2008).
Federal Railroad Administration ___________________
Subiect Matter Citation
Railroad operating standards Railroad Operating Rules: Program of
Operational Tests and Inspections;
Railroad Operating Practices: Handling
Equipment, Switches and Derails, 71 Fed.
Reg. 60,372, 60,404 (proposed Oct. 12,
2006).
Passenger safety equipment standards Passenger Equipment Safety Standards;
Front-End Strength of Cab Cars and
Multiple-Unit Locomotives, 72 Fed. Reg.
42,016, 42,036-37 (proposed Aug. 1,
2007).
Electronically controlled pneumatic Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake
brakes Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,820, 50,848-49
(proposed Sept. 4, 2007).
Incident reporting requirements Miscellaneous Amendments to the Federal
Railroad Administration's Accident
Incident Reporting Requirements, 73 Fed.
Reg. 52,496, 52,519 (proposed Sept. 9,
2008).
Continuous welded rail (inspections) Track Safety Standards; Continuous
Welded Rail, 73 Fed. Reg. 73,078,
_________________________ 73,089-90 (proposed Dec. 1, 2008).
Consumer Products Safety Commission
Subect Matter Citation
Mattress flammability Standard for the Flammability (Open
Flame) of Mattresses and Mattress)
Foundation Sets, 70 Fed. Reg. 2470, 24921
9(ppoeJan. 13, 2005).
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One reason why a campaign of this magnitude received only
modest attention from the press and the academic community is that
the agencies, for the most part, have simply announced their views on
preemption in a preamble to a regulation that does not itself address
preemption or in some other informal agency statement. Professor
Catherine Sharkey has aptly dubbed this approach "preemption by
preamble." 53 There are consequences to this informality. There is no
record against which to evaluate the agency's action, and the agency
is under no obligation to back up with evidence its argument that
implementation of state requirements is interfering with, or will
impair, the agency's ability to achieve federal objectives. To be sure,
the informality of the agency pronouncement deprives it of the strong
deference more formal agency action receives from reviewing
courts.54 But many courts have found that agency statements on
preemption are entitled to some deference.ss
III. WYETH V. LEVINE-BACKGROUND
The Achilles' heel in the Bush Administration's preemption
campaign is that agency pronouncements of preemption are not self-
executing. They are not set forth in a binding regulation or any other
Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Subject Matter Citation
Transportation of hazardous materials Hazardous Materials: Improving the Safety
by rail (joint rule with FRA) of Railroad Tank Car Transportation of
Hazardous Materials, 73 Fed. Reg. 17,818
17,852 (proposed Apr. 1, 2008).
Department of Homeland Security
Subect Matter Citation
Chemical facility anti-terrorism Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,292-
93 (proposed Dec. 28, 2006).
These tables were compiled in part with help from justice.org.
52 See FelIner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering
but rejecting argument that FDA's "regulatory approach" to the risks posed by mercury
compounds in tuna fish preempted tort claim based on mercury poisoning); see also People ex
rel. Lockyer v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, No. CGC-01-402975, CGC-04-432394, 2006 WL
1544384 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2006), judgment aff'd on other grounds sub nom., People ex
rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
53 Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007).
5 See Mendelson, supra note 11; see also In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp.
2d 776, 785 (E.D. La. 2007); In re Zyprexa Products Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273-74
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
ss See, e.g., Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharms., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1288-89 (W.D. Okla. 2008)
(citing cases); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 315-16 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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administrative acts having the force of law.5 The FDA's position on
preemption generated substantial litigation, with courts dividing on
whether to give the FDA's position deference and, if so, how much.
Although the majority of lower courts had rejected the FDA-backed
implied preemption argument, some courts accepted the argument and
dismissed cases on that ground .5
The signature case, however, is Wyeth v. Levine, which the Court
decided on March 4, 2009. These are the facts. On April 7, 2000,
Diana Levine went to a clinic for treatment of a migraine headache.5
She received an injection of Demerol for her headache and a dose of
Wyeth's drug Phenergan for nausea caused by her migraine headache
and a common side effect of Demerol .5  Ms. Levine's headache
returned and she went back to the clinic, where she received a
second dose of the Demerol-Phenergan combination. This time the
Phenergran was administered through an intravenous (or IV) push
injection into Ms. Levine's right arm .60 Phenergan's label permits this
method of administration, but warns that it carries a serious risk if the
drug inadvertently comes into contact with the patient's artery.
Tragically, the Phenergan penetrated one of Ms. Levine's arteries,
causing the surrounding tissue to die and become gangrenous .6 1 In the
following weeks, doctors had to amputate her hand and, ultimately,
the remainder of her arm below the elbow. Ms. Levine had been a
professional musician. She now struggles to perform daily tasks and
56 Ideed, given the absence of any delegation of preemption authority to the FDA by
Congress, it is doubtful that the FDA could have issued a binding regulation that would have
foreclosed state failure-to-warn litigation. See generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
255-56 (2006) (holding that because the FDA chose to articulate its new position in an informal
way, it is not entitled to Chevron deference); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-
28 (2001) (rejecting the argument that the substantial deference described in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), applies to informal agency
action).
57 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29-:30, wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2007 WL 776723; Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 14-17,
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2007 WL 1223762 (canvassing the case law as it stood
in early 2007). More recent cases have similarly split on the question. Compare, e.g., McDarby
v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 251-52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), and Tucker v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1238 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (rejecting
preemption), with Colacicco, v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2008) (accepting
limited preemption argument), cert. granted & judgment vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
58 Levine v. wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 179 (Vt. 2006), affd, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
59 The discussion of the background facts of the case are drawn from the Brief of
Respondent, Diana Levine, but are not in dispute. Brief for Respondent at 14-15, wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3285388; see also Brief for Petitioner
at 18-20, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2273067. The Court also briefly
discusses the facts at Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191-92.
60 Levine, 944 A.2d at 182.
61 Id.
90120091
902 ~CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [o.5:
household chores, has lost her livelihood, and has incurred hundreds
of thousands of dollars in medical bills.62
Ms. Levine sued her health care provider and Wyeth, Phenergan' s
manufacturer, in Vermont state court.6 The health care provider
settled, leaving Wyeth as the only defendant.64 Because of the acute
risk of arterial exposure when Phenergan is administered through an
IV-push, Ms. Levine argued that Wyeth failed to provide sufficient
warnings about the foreseeable risks from the IV-push.6 Experts
testified that the benefits of IV-push administration, as compared to
P1-drip (where the drug is slowly introduced through a drip bag), are
marginal, and that the use of P1-drip effectively precludes inadvertent
66arterial contact. Ms. Levine claimed, therefore, that the drug's label
should have contained an explicit warning directing physicians not to
use TV-push.
Wyeth's main defense was that the FDA approved Phenergan' s
labeling and a Vermont jury was not free to second-guess the FAs
determination.6 Wyeth argued the principles of conflict preemption
precluded Ms. Levine's claim because a jury ruling for Ms. Levine
might force Wyeth to add warnings the FDA had not approved and,
therefore, potentially subject the company to FDA sanctions. But the
jury found for Ms. Levine, awarding her damages amounting to
$7,400,000, which the court reduced to account for Ms. Levine's
earlier settlement with her health care providers.6
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed .69 The court held that
Wyeth had showed neither an actual conflict between FDA mandates
and Vermont state law nor frustration of federal objectives .70 Indeed,
the court found state and federal requirements compatible because
each requires drug manufacturers to add and strengthen warnings that
might be insufficient to protect patients .71' The court found no
evidence the FDA had ever considered and approved the P1-push
method of administration or intended to prohibit Wyeth from
strengthening its label to warn physicians against using P1-push. 2
62 Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 14-15.
63 Levine, 944 A.2d at 182.
64 Id. at 183.
65 Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 15.
66 See Levine, 944 A.2d at 182.
67 See id. at 183.
68 See wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009).
69 Levine, 944 A.2d at 197.
70 Id. at 189, 194.
71 See id. at 188-89.
72 Id.
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The Vermont Supreme Court's affirmance set the stage for the United
States Supreme Court to consider the issue.
The importance of the case is at least in part a consequence of the
breadth of the arguments made by the parties and their supporters.
The United States broadly argued that all state failure-to-warn claims
are preempted because state courts might "strike a different balance"
regarding the drug risks and benefits than the FDA.7 And "the fact
that juries instead of an expert agency would second-guess FDA's
judgments in individual cases only exacerbates the conflict.",74 The
United States also argued Wyeth could not change its labeling
without prior FDA approval unless it could point to "new" safety
information warranting an immediate change, which was not the case.
For this reason, the United States contended an adverse ruling against
Wyeth would effectively require Wyeth to rewrite Phenergan' s
labeling and undermine the FDA's control of drug labeling.7
Wyeth took a slightly different position. Wyeth argued that
principles of conflict and implied conflict preemption required
reversal because changing the drug's label without FDA approval
would render the drug "misbranded" and thus violate federal law.7
Wyeth acknowledged that FDA regulations establish "a limited
safe harbor from enforcement for manufacturers that implement
labeling changes prior to FDA approval when the change reflects
newly-acquired information about a drug's risks."7 In this case,
Wyeth argued, the FDA approved the Phenergan labeling "with full
information about the risks and benefits of the drug, and it instructed
Wyeth to use labeling that FDA had concluded best accommodated
those risks and benefits."7 Wyeth also argued that FDA labeling
decisions set a floor and a ceiling, and it was not free to depart from
FDA-prescribed labeling under these circumstances. Accordingly,
Wyeth also argued for outright reversal.7
Predictably, Ms. Levine and her supporters argued that, beyond the
ordinary presumption against preemption, the case for preemption
was especially weak because Congress never expressed any intent to
preempt state-law actions for prescription drugs, although there are
express preemption provisions in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
73 Brief for the United States as Amnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Wyeth, 129 S.
Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2308908.
74 Id. at 9.
75 See id. at 10.
76 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 59, at 30-39.
77 Id. at 27.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 55.
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(FDCA).8 Moreover, since the FDCA's passage, courts had
continued to adjudicate state-law failure-to-warn claims, and
Congress had not given drug companies the immunity from liability
they covet, even though it had repeatedly fine-tuned the FDCA. Ms.
Levine also argued that state tort law is no obstacle to the fulfillment
of federal objectives. 8' Ms. Levine pointed out that the FDA has long
encouraged drug manufacturers to strengthen the warnings on drug
labels to address safety concerns .8 FDA regulations give companies
an unqualified right to change a drug's labeling when necessary to
protect patients, provided the companies seek FDA approval after
making the change.8 Although Wyeth and the United States claimed
companies must base such changes on newly discovered risk
information, Ms. Levine argued that the regulation contains no such
limitation, and such a rule would impair public health by precluding
labeling changes based on a reexamination of existing evidence.8
Indeed, in that key respect, Ms. Levine contended, federal and state
requirements are parallel-they both place a duty on drug
manufacturers promptly to warn doctors and patients about risks not
adequately addressed on the drug's label.
Finally, Ms. Levine contended that, "as the Vermont courts found,
the record contain[ed] no evidence that FDA ever weighed the risks
and benefits of IV-push administration of Phenergan or made a
judgment that some benefit of IV-push injection in treating nausea
justified its increased risks of gangrene requiring amputation." 85
There was no preemption, Ms. Levine claimed, because there was no
basis to conclude the FDA had engaged in a specific balancing of the
benefits and risks of the IV-push method of administration.8
IV. WYETH v. LEwINE-THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court's opinion in Wyeth deserves close attention. After
reviewing the facts of the case, the Court declares that its analysis
"'must be guided by two cornerstones of our pre-emption
jurisprudence. 8 The Court first repeats its familiar refrain that "'the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
80 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 21.
81 Id. at 27-28
82 Id. at 32-44.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 23, 48-55.
85 Id. at 24.
86 Id.
87 wyeth v. Levine, 1295S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009).
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case."' 88 Second, and more controversially, the Court extends its
"clear statement" federalism rule to "'all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has "legislated . .. in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied.""'. 8 9 In these cases,
courts should ""'start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.""'.90
Applying the presumption against preemption to Wyeth's claim of a
direct conflict preemption claim, argues the dissent, constitutes an
unwarranted extension of existing law.91
The Court then briefly reviews the evolution of federal regulation
of drugs and drug labeling in an effort to identify the "purpose of
Congress." In the course of tracing this more than century long
history, the Court notes that as Congress "enlarged the FDA's
powers," it "took care to preserve state law."9 The Court points
out that with the FDCA's 1962 amendments-requiring drug
manufacturers to show that drugs are not just safe but also effective
for their intended use--Congress added a savings clause providing
that "state law would only be invalidated upon a 'direct and positive
conflict' with the FDCA," and thereafter "common-law suits
'continued unabated despite . .. FDA regulation."' 93 When Congress
revisited the FDCA in 1976 to add an express preemption provision
for medical devices, it again "declined to enact such a provision for
prescription drugs."9 And after Ms. Levine's lawsuit was filed, the
Court notes Congress again amended the FDCA in 2007 to, for the
first time, give the FDA authority to direct drug manufacturers to
change drug labeling on the basis of information that emerges after
the drug's initial approval, rejecting a Senate bill "that would have
required the FDA to preapprove all changes to drug labels" and
instead "adopt[ing] a rule of construction to make it clear that
manufacturers remain responsible for updating their labels."9
The Court then addresses, and quickly dismisses, Wyeth's
direct conflict preemption argument. Wyeth argued it would be
"impossible" to comply with its federal labeling duties and those
88 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
89 Id. (quoting I.ohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Cop. 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947))) (ellipsis in original).
90 Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)).
91 Compare id. at 1195 n.3, with id. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for extending the presumption against preemption to cases involving direct conflict claims).
92 Id. at 1195-936 (maj ority opinion).
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imposed under state law because, "if it had unilaterally added" a
warning, "it would have violated federal law governing unauthorized
distribution and misbranding" of drugs.9 But the Court rejects
Wyeth's reading of the FDCA, noting the "FDCA does not provide
that a drug is misbranded simply because the manufacturer has altered
an FDA-approved label."9 More broadly, the Court rejects what it
calls "Wyeth's cramped reading" of FDA regulations permitting drug
companies to make labeling changes without FDA' s prior approval
for safety reasons.9 The Court also criticizes Wyeth's suggestion
"that the FDA, rather than the manufacturer, bears primary
responsibility for drug labeling." 99 As the Court puts it, "through
many amendments to the FDCA and to FDA regulations, it has
remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the
manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all
times."0
Because Wyeth retained authority to change the drug's label, the
Court frames the dispositive question as whether Wyeth presented
"clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to
[the drug's] label" to warn more forcefully against the IV-push
method of administration. 01 Wyeth "offered no such evidence," and
thus "Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for it to
comply with both federal and state requirements."102
It bears noting that, in so ruling, the Court erects a high barrier to
future preemption claims based on conflict preemption principles. Not
only does the Court place squarely on the manufacturer the burden of
96 Id. at 1197.
97 Id.
98 Id. Here the Court side-steps a road-block the FDA added to the litigation once the
Court granted review. In 2008, the agency promulgated a rule modifying its "changes being
effected," or CBE, rules governing when drug manufacturers may change labels without first
securing the FDA's approval. Id. at 1196. The 2008 rule, Supplemental Applications Proposing
Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603,
49,609 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pts. 314, 601, and 814), provides that
manufacturers may make unilateral changes to a drug's label only "'to reflect newly acquired
information."' Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,609). Although the rule
was not in effect at the time of Ms. Levine's injury, wyeth and the Government argued that it
reflected the FDA's historic understanding, even though, as the Court pointed out, the FDA's
drug labeling regulations make clear that drug manufacturers may make labeling changes
without the FDA's prior approval to address safety concerns. The Court pointed out that, even
under the FDA's 2008 CBE rules, Wyeth would have been free to make the labeling changes
Ms. Levine sought because, in light of the twenty or so amputations caused by Phenergan,
Wyeth would have been able to do a new analysis of the drug's risks and make a labeling
change based on that analysis. Id. at 1197.
99 Id.
101d at 1197-98.
101 Id. at 1198.
10 d at 1198, 1199.
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producing "clear evidence" that the FDA would not have permitted a
stronger warning, but the Court also adds that "[i]mpossibility pre-
emption is a demanding defense." 103 It remains to be seen whether the
Court's conflict preemption discussion leaves open any door for drug
companies to successfully assert conflict prepio.0
The Court concentrates most of its attention on Wyeth's implied
preemption claim, supported by the United States, that "requiring it to
comply with a state-law duty to provide a stronger warning about IV-
push administration would obstruct the purposes and objectives of
federal drug labeling regulation."10 5 The Court emphatically rejects
this argument: "We find no merit in this argument, which relies on an
untenable interpretation of congressional intent and an overbroad
view of an agency's power to pre-empt state lw"0
The Court is equally dismissive of Wyeth's argument on
congressional intent. "Wyeth contends that the FDCA establishes
both a floor and a ceiling for drug regulation."' 07 But "[t]he most
glaring problem with this argument is that all evidence of Congress'
purposes is to the contrary." 108 After all, if "Congress thought state-
law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have
enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the
FDCA's 70-year history." 09 Congress's "silence on the issue,
coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort
litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA
oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness."" 0
Having established that "Congress did not regard state tort
litigation as an obstacle to achieving its purposes," the Court next
examines Wyeth's claim that the FAs 2006 preamble statement
rightly determined that "the FDCA establishes both a floor and a
ceiling, so that FDA approval of drug labeling . . . preempts
conflicting or contrary State law.""1' Citing Geier, the Court notes
that "an agency regulation with the force of law can pre-empt
10 Id. at 1199.
I'l One indication may come with the Third Circuit's reconsideration of Colacicco v.
Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), which found drug claims preempted on conflict
preemption grounds. After the Court's ruling in Wyeth, the Court granted the pending petition
for certiorari in Colacicco, vacated the Third Circuit's prior ruling, and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Wyeth. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).






"IId. (internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipsis in original).
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conflicting state requirements," but there is "no such regulation in this
case." 112 Rather, there is the "agency's mere assertion that state law is
an obstacle to achieving its statutory objectives.""' The Court
recognizes that in prior cases, including Geier, it has given some
weight to an agency's view on preemption, but that the weight to be
accorded an agency's position "depends on its thoroughness,
consistency, and persuasiveness."'" 4 Once again, the FDA was in for
rough sledding: "Under this standard, the FDA's 2006 preamble does
not merit deference."" 5
The Court rejects the FDA position on both procedural and
substantive grounds. The Court first criticizes the FDA for what it
sees as bait-and-switch Federal Register notices. The Court notes that
the labeling rule's notice of proposed rule-making explained the rule
would not preempt state law, while the preamble to the final rule
"articulated a sweeping position on the FDCA's pre-emptive effect,"
"without offering States or other interested parties notice or
opportunity for comment."" 6 These procedural failures led the Court
to conclude that the "agency's views on state law are inherently
suspect."' 1
The Court is just as critical of the FDA's substantive arguments,
addressing and rejecting, often in quite dismissive language, each of
the agency's pro-preemption arguments. To start, the Court finds the
preamble statement "is at odds with what evidence we have of
Congress' purposes.""18 This discrepancy, says the Court, is
especially troubling because the agency's 2006 statement "reverses
the FAs own longstanding position without providing a reasoned
explanation, including any discussion of how state law has interfered
with the FDA's regulation of drug labeling during decades of
coexistence."" 9 Indeed, "[niot once prior to Levine's injury did the
FDA suggest that state tort law stood as an obstacle to its statutory
mission." 120 To the contrary, the agency "cast federal labeling
standards as a floor upon which States could build and repeatedly
disclaimed any attempt to pre-empt failure-to-warn claims."'12 '
112 1Id. 1200-01 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).







20 Id. at 1201-02.
1211Id. at 1202.
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This abrupt about-face on preemption, the Court observes, also
weakens the FDA's ability to safeguard the public. 'iITlhe FDA
traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of drug
regulation," because the agency has "limited resources to monitor the
11,000 drugs on the market, and manufacturers have superior access
to information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing
phase as new risks emerge." 122 The Court also finds considerable fault
in the FDA' s failure to look at the consequences of its pro-preemption
position, namely the removal of the market disciplines provided by
state-law tort suits that both "uncover unknown drug hazards and
provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks
promptly" and "serve a distinct compensatory function that may
motivate injured persons to come forward with information." 2
Finally, the Court addresses Geier and explains why Wyeth, the
FDA, and the dissent are wrong to suggest it is controlling. To the
Court the most salient difference between the cases is that the Geier
Court itself conducted an independent preemption analysis, and did so
on the basis of a complete record made by NHTSA during the course
of a full-scale notice and comment rulemaking. 124 Only "[a]fter
conducting [its] own pre-emption analysis" did the Geier Court
consider "the agency's explanation of how state law interfered with
its regulation."125 The Court regarded the agency's statement "as
further support for [its] independent conclusion that the plaintiff's tort
claim obstructed the federal regime." 2 o nyddteCutfn
no "specific agency regulation bearing the force of law" here, but also
noted that the agency's 2006 preamble statement "does not merit
deference for the reasons [the Court has] explained."' 2 7 And the Court
also notes that in Geier the "'complex and extensive' regulatory
history and background relevant" to the case was consistent with the
agency's position, while in this case the relevant history and
background "reveal the longstanding coexistence of state and federal
law and the FDA's traditional recognition of state-law remedies."128
The Court ends its opinion with a parting shot to the FDA: "Congress
I" Id. (footnote omitted).
23 Id.
124 Id. at 1203.
125 Id.
126Id
127 MI. The Court goes on to also say that "[tihe United States' amicus brief is similarly
undeserving of deference." Id. at 1203 n. 13. In contrast to the Government's brief in Geier,
"1which explained the effects of state law on the DOT's regulation in a manner consistent with
the agency's prior accounts," the Conurt said that here "the Government's explanation of federal
drug regulation departs markedly from the FDA's understanding at all times relevant to this
case." Id.
128 Id. at 1203 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor C'o., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)).
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has repeatedly declined to pre-empt state law, and the FDA's recently
adopted position that state tort suits interfere with its statutory
mandate is entitled to no weight."129
Five Justices joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion: Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Breyer wrote a brief
separate concurrence leaving open the possibility that a specific
agency regulation bearing the force of law might serve as a ceiling as
well as a floor, but recognizing that no such regulation was before the
Court. 10Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment and wrote a
separate opinion criticizing the Court's implied preemption
jurisprudence. Indeed, he explains that he writes separately "because I
cannot join the majority's implicit endorsement of far-reaching
implied pre-emption doctrines." 3  Justice Thomas' criticisms of
implied preemption doctrines echo his prior writings. 12Justice Alito
authored the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Scalia, arguing that principles of both conflict and implied conflict
preemption dictate a ruling in Wyeth's favor.133
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S RULING IN WYETH
As I made clear at the outset, Wyeth's significance extends well
beyond the confines of this case, and indeed well beyond the confines
of informing our understanding of the Court's implied conflict
preemption jurisprudence. Wyeth is important because (a) it reshapes
and significantly limits the reach of the implied conflict preemption
doctrine, and in so doing, restrains the impact of Geier; (b) it likely
consigns the Bush Administration's effort to cut back on tort law by
regulatory fiat to judicial repudiation; and (c) it reinvigorates the role
of tort law in deterring excessive risk-taking, in serving as a sentinel
in detecting risk information that is not available to regulators, and in
compensating those injured through no fault of their own.
A. Wyeth and Regulatory Implied Conflict Preemption
From a doctrinal standpoint, Wyeth's most important contribution
is to change dramatically the framework for evaluating claims of
regulatory implied conflict preemption. As noted at the outset, Geier
suggests that agency pronouncement should play an important, and
1291d. at 1204.
130Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
'31 Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
132 Sediscussion and cases cited supra note 13.
13 Wyeth, 1295S. Ct. at 1217 (Auito, J., dissenting).
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often decisive, role in judicial determinations of preemption.314 And
as I have argued above, one problem with Geier is that it took the
agency's claims of interference at face value.
Wyeth takes the opposite tack, undoubtedly, in part, because the
many danger signals that factors other than a genuine concern about
state law standing as an obstacle to federal goals spurred the FDA's
about-face on preemption were not seen by the Court as false alarms.
Indeed, it is hard to read the majority opinion in Wyeth as anything
but an outright repudiation of the FDA's pro-preemption position.
The Court's language-calling the FDA's position "without merit"
and assailing the FDA's assertions as "not meritijing] deference, ,3
"inherently suspect,"136 " at odds with what evidence we have,"13 7
having "no merit" and "entitled to no weight"'13 8 -iS the language of
condemnation, not the more measured language the Court generally
uses in critiquing the views of a coordinate branch of government.
Perhaps more importantly, under Wyeth courts are to look beyond
an agency's statements about the nature and degree of state law
interference with federal objectives and to instead make an
independent determination that the agency is able to accomplish
federal goals and that state law actually stands as an obstacle to the
agency' s mission.' 39 To be sure, the agency's pro-preemption
statement might inform the court's decision, depending on "its
thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness." 140 But it is up to the
court to determine the preemption question based on an inquiry that
takes into account three factors: (a) is the federal agency able to
achieve its statutory goals single-handedly; (b) are the agency's
claims of preemption based on hard evidence or are there danger
signals that the claims are the product of agency capture; and (c) the
extent to which the informational and compensatory functions of state
tort law help fulfill federal objectives.""4
Wyeth makes clear that considerations of agency competence are
now part of the mix in regulatory implied preemption cases. The
Court takes a hard look at the FDA's assertion that it can single-
handedly guarantee the safety of each of the 11,000 drugs on the
market and that state failure-to-warn cases undermine the FDA's
ability to do its job. But the Court finds no evidence to support the
34 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-84 (2000).
13 Wyeth. 129 S. Ct. at 1203.36M. at 1201.
137 Id.




41 See id. at 1200, 1202-1203, 1202 n..
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agency's claim and substantial evidence that undermines it. The Court
observes that, "[iln keeping with Congress' decision not to pre-empt
common-law tort suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded
state [tort] law as a complementary form of drug regulation. The FDA
has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market
.... ,14 And then, in a lengthy footnote, the Court cites four studies
of the FDA's performance in monitoring the safety of drugs-one
dating back to 1955, the others recent reports from the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academies of Sciences, the Government
Accountability Office, and the FDA's own Science Advisory Board-
that are each highly critical of the agency's ability to successfully
engage in post-marketing surveillance of drugs because of chronic
resource limitations and serious gaps in the agency's statutory
authority.143 In the face of this evidence, the Court seems unwilling to
accept the FDA's "mere assertion" that it alone, without the backstop
of state tort law, can effectively discipline the marketplace. 144
Equally important, the Court was alert to suggestions of agency
capture. 44' Although set forth in a footnote, the Court cites with
approval a Report of the Majority Staff of the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform titled "FDA Career Staff
Objected to Agency Preemption Policies."'46 This report issued on
October 29, 2008-after briefing had been completed and less than a
week before the Wyeth case was argued before the Supreme Court-
evaluates the key assertions underlying the FDA's new preemption
position and concludes, as the Court notes, that "[tlhe Office of Chief
142 Id. at 1202.
143 Id. at 1202 n..
144Id. at 1201.
145 There had already been considerable discussion in the press and in the academic
literature about what appeared to be evidence of agency capture at the FDA. This evidence is
discussed in detail in James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA 's Second Century:
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939
(2008). This is not the only FDA decision that has been criticized on agency capture grounds.
Recently, in Tummino v. Torti, No. 05-CV-366, 2009 WL 750004 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2009),
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York set aside the Bush
Administration's denial of a citizen petition to make available the post-coital contraceptive
"Plan B" more accessible to woman seventeen years and older. The Court found that the FDA's
decision was made "at the behest of political actors" and was subject to "political
considerations, delays, and implausible justifications" that "evidence ... a lack of good faith
and reasoned agency decision-making." Id. at *2.
146Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 n. 11. The Report suggests that the timing of the Report's
release was a result of the delay by the FDA in providing its records and the unwillingness of
the Department of Health and Human Services to provide relevant records to the Committee
reflecting its role and the role of the white House. See HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
GOVERNMENT REFORM, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, FDA CAREER STAFF OBJEc'rED To AGENCY
PREEMPTION POLICIES 14-15 (2008), available at http://oversighthouse.gov/story.asp?ID=2266
[hereinafter HOUSE STAFF REPORT].
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Counsel ignored the warnings from FDA scientists and career
officials that the preemption language [of the 2006 preamble] was
based on erroneous assertions about the ability of the drug approval
process to ensure accurate and up-to-date drug labels." 147
The House Staff Report points out that the preemption language in
the 2006 preamble was proposed by the Office of Chief Counsel, not
the agency's career staff, and rested mainly on three factual claims:
(1) the FDA, and not drug manufacturers, exercises principal
responsibility over drug labels; (2) permitting drug companies to
make changes to drug labels for safety reasons without the FDA's
prior approval is likely to result in "over-warning," which may impair
safety; and (3) the FDA's longstanding view was that manufacturers
may change labels to address safety concerns if, but only if, there is
"new"~ information that justifies the change. The Staff's investigation
sought to determine whether the agency had supporting evidence for
these assertions. The evidence the investigators uncovered showed
that, in each case, the agency's career scientific staff disagreed with
the agency's lawyers.
First, as to the Chief Counsel's claim that the FDA exercises
"6virtually plenary authority over drug labeling," Dr. John Jenkins,
Director of the Office of New Drugs in the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research and the FDA' s most senior official in the
new drug review process, explained to the Chief Counsel's office that
the assertion is "based on a false assumption that the FDA approved
labeling is fully accurate and up-to-date in a real time basis. We know
that such an assumption is false." 148 Indeed, Dr. Jenkins continued,
the claim is "'a major overstatement of the facts and actual situation"'
because "we know that many current approved drug labels are out of
date and in many cases contain incorrect informnation"'-at times the
agency had "'a backlog of over 1000 labeling supplements."" , 4 9 Dr.
Jane Axelrad, Associate Director for Policy in the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, similarly objected to the Chief Counsel's
claim that the "'FDA is constantly monitoring the literature and that
we force sponsors to add new risk information whenever we see a
147 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 n.1 1 (brackets in original) (quoting HOUSE STAFF REPORT,
supra note 146, at 4).
148 HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 146, at 6, i.
149 Id. at 6 (quoting E-mail from Dr. John Jenkins, Director, Office of New Drugs, Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), to Jane Axelrad, CDER Associate Director for
Policy and Director, cDER's Office of Regulatory Policy, Dr. Robert Temple, Director,
CDER's Office of Medical Policy, and Dr. Rachel Behrman, Deputy Director, CDER's Office
of Medical Policy (Aug. 6, 2003)).
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study that suggests that one drug may be better than another. Nothing
could be further from the truth."' 150
Second, as to the Chief Counsel's claim that permitting drug
companies to strengthen warnings without advance FDA approval
would lead to over-warning, Dr. Axelrad wrote the Chief Counsel that
"'[wje rarely find ourselves in situations where sponsors want to
disclose more risk information than we think is necessary. To the
contrary, we usually find ourselves dealing with situations where
sponsors want to minimize risk information.', 15'1 Dr. Jenkins was
even more critical:
"The entire argument put forward that sponsors are insisting
on exaggerated statements of risk information is nalve to
what actually occurs in practice. While I do not believe that
most sponsors deliberately attempt to obscure risk
infomation ... in the product labeling, I also believe that it is
true that sponsors attempt to present the information in a way
that does not put their product at a competitive disadvantage
to other products. .. ."' 52
Third, as to the Chief Counsel's argument that the FDA
historically did not permit drug companies to strengthen labels
without the agency's prior approval, Dr. Axeirad said:
"[T]he statement that 'FDA believes manufacturers should
add risk information only after consulting with the agency'..
.. is not true and is not consistent with our CBE [changes
being effected] regulations. Granted we review CBE
supplements, but we do not discourage sponsors from adding
new information via this route. In fact, the regs encourage use
of this route as it allows the label to be updated in the most
timely manner." 153
'
55 Id. at 7 (quoting E-mail from Jane Axelrad to Daniel Troy, Chief Counsel, Coleen
Klasmeier, then Special Assistant to FDA Chief Counsel, Commissioner McClellan, Dr. Janet
Woodcock, and Dr. Steven Galson (Aug. 7, 2Q03)).
151 Id. at 6 (quoting E-mail from Jane Axelrad to Daniel Troy, Coleen Klasmeier,
Commissioner McClellan, Dr. Janet Woodcock, and Dr. Steven Galson (Aug. 7, 2003)).152MI. at 5 (quoting E-mail from Dr. John Jenkins to Jane Axelrad (May 22, 2003)). Dr.
Jenkins added: ...I think the whole argument that liability concerns drive inaccurate labeling is
false and misleading.. .. [Tjhe whole argument that liability concerns lead to decreased product
innovation or product withdrawals is not supported by adequate data."' Id. (quoting E-mail from
Dr. John Jenkins to Jane Axeirad (May 22, 2003)) (ellipsis and bracket in original).
1531d. at 7 (quoting E-mail from Jane Axetrad to Daniel Troy, Coleen Klasmeier,
Commissioner McClellan, Dr. Janet Woodcock, and Dr. Steven Galson (Aug. 7, 2003)).
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Dr. Jenkins also disagreed with the Chief Counsel, noting that he
objected to the Chief Counsel's claim that ""'[m]anufacturers
generally consult FDA before adding risk information to labeling,""'..
noting that "'I don't know what this statement is based on and it is not
in agreement with the large number of CBE labeling supplements to
add risk information that we receive each year.""154
Notwithstanding the uniform objections of the FDA' s senior
scientific career staff, the 2006 preamble asserts that permitting state
failure-to-warn cases could encourage "'defensive labeling,"' could
interfere with the FDA's ability to "'control[] the content of
labeling,"' could impair the agency's ability to continuously monitor
"'the latest available scientific informnation' to 'incorporate [that]
information into [a] product's label[]I,"' and that "'manufacturers
typically consult with FDA"' before strengthening labels.155 These
assertions, of course, were repeated in the brief of the Solicitor
General defending the FAs position.156
The fact that Justice Stevens not only cites the House Staff Report,
but quotes its ultimate conclusion about the struggle within the FDA
on preemption, is powerful evidence that agency capture concerns
may have influenced the Court's decision. The Report makes clear
that, to the extent there was concern in the agency over the possibility
that state failure-to-warn cases might obstruct the agency's ability to
do its job, that concern was localized within the Chief Counsel's
office and was not shared by the agency's career experts. Thus, the
Report may have reassured the Court that a ruling in Ms. Levine's
favor would not imperil the FDA's ability to pursue its objectives.
To be sure, Wyeth may be the rare case where concerns about the
agency's competence and independence come to the fore. But post-
Wyeth courts will likely be more sensitive to these concerns, which
will be a step forward from Geier where the Court did not even
acknowledge its own warning about the automobile industry's
inappropriate influence over NHTSA. 15 7 Indeed, it is worth asking
154 Id. at 6 (quoting E-mail from Dr. John Jenkins to Jane Axeirad, Dr. Robert Temple, and
Dr. Rachel Behrman (Aug. 6, 2003)).1551d. at 7-8 (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006)).
15 6 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 73. 1
do not suggest that the lawyers in the Solicitor General's Office knew about the disagreement
within the FDA, much less that they were obligated to respond to the House Staff Report
shedding light on that disagreement. I imagine, however, that the Report engendered some
measure of discomfort among the highly professional lawyers in the Office.
57 Asnoted, the majority in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Asssociation v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., rejected NHTSA's effort to further delay the introduction of
air bags because its justification "runs counter to the evidence" and "is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." 463 U.S. 29,
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whether there is much left of Geier after Wyeth. Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Wyeth Court (and recall that Justice Stevens led the
dissent in Geier, criticizing the "'free-form judicial policymnaking"", 5 8
undertaken by the majority) limits Geier to its facts. 5 9 And
intervening decisions, especially the Court's recent ruling in Altria
Group, Inc. v. Good, 16 0 have refused to sustain implied preemption
claims. It may be that Geier is the first casualty of Wyeth.
B. Wyeth and the Demise of the Bush Administration's Regulatory
Implied Conflict Preemption Campaign
Outside of the drug arena, the impact of Wyeth may be felt first in
preemption claims based on the Bush Administration's regulatory
preemption campaign. In my view, the analytical framework the
Court employs in Wyeth consigns those preemption claims to almost
certain judicial rejection. There are several reasons for this
conclusion. To start with, Wyeth first focuses on whether there is any
indicium of a congressional intent to preempt. The Court found the
FDA's position flawed because, rather than finding a congressional
intent to oust state law, the Court found a congressional intent to
preserve state law.'16'
The same is true of the statutes administered by NHTSA, CPSC,
and ERA. 162 The organic statutes of these agencies either do not
contain express preemption provisions, or, if they do, have savings
clauses that explicitly preserve state tort law.'16 3 Thus there is no
statutory basis to distinguish preemption claims these agencies make
from the claim the Court rejected in Wyeth. Nor can the agencies
defend their claims on the ground of administrative consistency.
Wyeth found that the FDA's about-face on preemption was a danger
signal that something was amiss. Again, the same difficulty will
confront the other agencies, since they too have previously taken the
position that their regulatory actions did not preempt state law.l16
43 (1983).
15 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 911 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting I LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1177 (3d ed.
2000)).
159 wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1203.
160129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002)
(rejecting implied conflict preemption claim).
161 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
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Just as important is Wyeth's demand for evidence of frustration of
federal objectives and its unwillingness to defer to mere assertions of
possible interference. One clear conclusion to draw from Wyeth is that
the Court wants evidence that state-law is in fact interfering with the
agency's ability to do its job.16 1 Wyeth lost because neither it nor the
FDA could produce evidence of actual interference. The courts are
likely to demand the same from other agencies. This factor too will
undercut pro-preemption arguments, because the agencies have all
long engaged in regulation with state law as a backdrop to their
regulatory efforts, without evidence of actual interference. The FDA
had no answer to the Court's "why now" question; as the Court
pointed out, FDA regulation and state tort law had co-existed for
decades. What had changed to transform complementary co-existence
into obstacle preemption?166 The FDA's inability to provide a
plausible answer to that question undermined its case. It is hard to
imagine any of the other agencies having a better answer.
Finally, the Wyeth Court was troubled by the FAs failure to
provide any sort of public proceeding in formulating its new,
pro-preemption position. Indeed, the Court said that the FAs new
position was "inherently suspect" because it failed to provide "States
or other interested parties notice or opportunity for comment." 16 ' And
none of these agencies gave the public notice or an opportunity to
comment on their new preemption positions; each simply announced
their new positions on regulatory preemption and argued that notice
was not required.'16 8 Wyeth thus appears to deal a body blow to the
Bush Administration's regulatory preemption campaign.
C Wyeth Reinvigorates the Role of Tort Law
Perhaps the ultimate irony of Wyeth is that instead of becoming a
symbol of the retrenchment of tort law, as Wyeth's supporters
expected, Wyeth may come to stand as a symbol of the reaffirmation
of tort litigation as a valuable complement to federal regulation. After
all, Wyeth rejects emphatically the idea that federal regulation shifts
the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that a product is reasonably
safe for its intended use on to the federal government. That
responsibility, says the Court, falls squarely on the shoulders of the
manufacturers, who have superior access to information about their
165 Wyeth. 129 S. Ct. at 1198-1200.
166 See viadeck, The FDA and Deference Lost, supra note 8.
16, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
168Statement of David C. Vladeck, supra note 45, at 179 n. 13.
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product's performance in the market, and for that reason "bear[]
responsibility for the content of [their] label[s] at all times."169
Wyeth also underscores the important role that tort law plays in
providing information about product hazards that might escape the
attention of regulators, or come to the regulators' attention well after
the manufacturer is alerted to the risk. 170 The Court points out that tort
litigation "provide~s] incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose
safety risks promptly" as a means of avoiding adverse tort rulings.'17 1
The Court also makes clear that it values the compensatory function
of tort law, not just as an aid to those injured by drugs that prove to be
unsafe, but to "motivate injured persons to come forward with
information" about those risks. 12The Court's focus on the
informational role tort litigation serves was not inadvertent. To the
contrary, the Court was using it to underscore the point that federal
preemption comes at a cost-not just to the unfortunate person, like
Diana Levine, who is injured through no fault of her own-but to
society as a whole. Society benefits when injured people like Diana
Levine stand up and use the courts not just to redress their own
grievances, but also to alert regulators, doctors, and patients that a
widely used drug like Phenergan poses an unreasonable risk of
grievous harm.173
161) Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
l701d. at 1202.
1711Id.
173 As a post-script, it bears noting that on September 16, 2009, the FDA ordered
manufacturers of the drug to place a "black box" warning on its label urging caution in
administering the drug because of the risks of gangrene and amputation. See, e.g., Gardiner
Harris, F.D.A. to Require Strict Warning on Anti-Nausea Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, at
B36; Linda A. Johnson, FDA requires strong amputation warning on sedative, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 16, 2009.
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